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Research Participants and the Right to be Informed 
Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword 
 
I Introduction 
Introducing Autonomy, Consent and the Law,1 Sheila McLean remarks that if the law is ‘to 
facilitate or protect the capacity of an autonomous person to make an autonomous choice—one 
that reflects his or her own values—it is necessary to develop standards that can ensure 
meaningful patient participation in healthcare decisions.’2 And, the development of such 
standards, McLean suggests, ‘is generally said to be the function of the legal doctrine of 
consent.’3 However, having analysed a sweep of English medical law (focusing on end-of-life 
questions, pregnancy, genetics, and organ transplantation), McLean claims that the 
jurisprudence of (informed) consent is less than fully congruent with the idea that the autonomy 
of the patient is focal. Indeed, McLean concludes: ‘In building the rules around consent to 
treatment, courts have stopped short of ensuring that people are fully informed and therefore 
truly able to weigh their decisions and act in a self-determining manner.’4 
Following McLean, we would say that, were autonomy to be regarded as focal, it would be for 
each individual patient, not for clinicians, to decide whether a suitable available treatment 
should be commenced, modified, or discontinued, and which of such treatments to have. 
Guided by such an autonomy model, (informed) consent would translate in the following way. 
If a patient refuses to consent to a procedure (for example, a pregnant woman refuses to consent 
to a Caesarean section or a person refuses assisted nutrition and hydration5), then she should 
not be subjected to the procedure; conversely, if a person consents to the administration of a 
drug (for example, a drug that will end her life), then the drug should be administered. 
McLean’s point is that, if consent is to serve the autonomy of a patient, it must be designed to 
track and reflect that particular patient’s will (however seemingly ‘irrational’ or 
‘unreasonable’) rather than operate in accordance with its own rules.6 
                                                          
1  Sheila A.M. McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010). 
 
2  McLean, note 1 above, at 3. 
 
3  Ibid. 
 
4  McLean, note 1 above, at 216. 
 
5  Of course, there is a questionmark about whether ANH is appropriately characterised as a form of 
medical treatment: see Sheila A.M. McLean, ‘From Bland to Burke: The Law and Politics of Assisted 
Nutrition and Hydration’ in Sheila A.M. McLean (ed), First Do No Harm (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) 
431. 
 
6  See McLean, note 1 above, at 98: ‘It is generally agreed that the corollary of the right to consent to 
treatment is the right to refuse it.  While choosing to accept recommended therapy can be an affirmation 
of the patient’s autonomy, so too can be his/her decision to avoid or reject it. Both are about self-
determination or control over our lives….While rejecting treatment may seem in some cases to be 
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According to McLean, the autonomy of patients is compromised not only when their consent 
or refusal of consent is egregiously ignored but also when they make decisions that ‘are based 
on misunderstandings or on overt or covert denial of choice resulting from withholding of 
information that would have been important to that particular patient….’7 Following up this 
latter claim, we might inquire how far the foreground ‘informational’ doctrines of English 
medical law serve the background idea that the patient’s autonomy is fundamental. This 
prompts McLean to review the well-known common law cases on disclosure of risk.8 However, 
we might extend this line of inquiry. For example, in the context of experimental procedures, 
we might ask whether the law requires clinicians to inform patients in a way that facilitates the 
latter making their own treatment decisions.9 If the law permits a clinician to withhold 
information about a procedure in order to steer the patient towards a treatment decision that 
health-care professionals would generally endorse, this suggests that a thread of paternalism 
remains in the law; and, by contrast, if the law permits a clinician to withhold information about 
a procedure in order to steer the patient towards a treatment decision that health-care 
professionals would generally regard as far too risky, this raises quite different concerns about 
the safety of patients. Either way, the autonomy of patients is compromised. 
In this paper, our interest is in the analogous question of the responsibilities of researchers to 
inform participants in a way that respects the autonomy of the latter. If participation is to be 
on an informed basis, there are many questions to be answered—for example, questions that 
relate to the purpose (or purposes) of the study, whether the research processes or products 
might be patented (and commercialised), whether and how the privacy of participants and the 
confidentiality of their information will be respected, whether participants will remain 
identifiable (and linkable to the samples and data that they provide), whether participants have 
proprietary rights in relation to their samples and data, and so on. Much could be written about 
each of these questions. However, our present interest is in the responsibilities of researchers 
to return autonomy-relevant findings to their (identifiable) participants—in short, the question 
is whether there will be (and should be) any individualised feedback of health-related findings 
made by the researchers. For example, if a researcher realises that a particular participant has 
a life-threatening aneurysm, would the law be deviating from an autonomy-centred focus if it 
did not require the finding to be disclosed—or, at any rate, would this be a deviation if the 
participant had either already consented to the return of findings or had not indicated that there 
should be no return of findings? 
                                                          
irrational…there may be reasons—possibly unknown to healthcare professional—that lead people to 
make the decision not to accept it.’ 
 
7  McLean, note 1 above, at 61. 
 
8  McLean, note 1 above, at 73-86. The leading case in English law is Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 
Governors and Others (1985) 1 BMLR 132. 
 
9  Compare the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the Brain (London, 
June 2013) 111-113. 
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Currently, this line of inquiry is of intense interest because it takes us to one of the most 
complex and contested issues in the ethics and governance of biobanks. The central question 
here—a question that Catherine Heeney and Michael Parker rightly single out as ‘[o]ne of the 
most hotly debated’ in the context of modern biobanking practice—is ‘whether there is an 
obligation to feedback research results to participants.’10 Suppose, for example, that 
researchers, who are conducting genetic analysis on biobanked materials, identify a particular 
mutation for breast cancer in a sample provided by an identifiable participant. Do the 
researchers have an obligation to inform the participant; or, to turn this round, does the 
participant have a right to be informed? If it is claimed that the participant does have such a 
right, a host of further questions need to be addressed, including questions about the scope of 
the right, its weight in relation to any competing rights, whether researchers owe feedback 
responsibilities also to third parties (such as relatives of the participant), how the information 
is to be conveyed to the participant, how the right might be affected by an explicit ‘no feedback’ 
policy at the biobank, and whether the right to be informed also implies a right that researchers 
actively ‘look out for’ potentially clinically significant findings.11   
Responding to the headline question of whether researchers have a responsibility to feed back 
to individual participants those findings that might be clinically significant, we are guided by 
a rights-based ethic, specifically an ethic that is rooted in the seminal work of Alan Gewirth.12 
According to Gewirthian ethics, in a community of rights, agents are categorically required to 
respect the generic conditions of agency—for present purposes, particularly the conditions of 
physical and psychological well-being that are essential before an agent has any prospect of 
successfully engaging in purposive activity (whatever the agent’s purpose, whatever the 
activity). The generic rights that agents directly hold against one another are both negative 
(against unwilled acts of interference with the generic conditions) and positive (for acts of 
assistance in support of their generic conditions provided that this is consistent with the agent’s 
will and does not threaten equally or more important generic rights of those providing 
assistance). It follows that our blunt—we emphasise that this is extremely blunt—response to 
the central question is that, where the information in question relates to an agent’s generic 
conditions, then researchers do have feedback responsibilities to their individual participants.  
The paper is in three principal parts. First, we sketch the context for the present debate about 
the informational responsibilities of researchers, particularly analysing the significance of a 
biobank’s ‘no feedback’ policy and the plausibility of a participant’s claim that they have a 
‘reasonable expectation’ that feedback will be provided. Secondly, we outline the key features 
of the Gewirthian view of positive rights and its justification. Thirdly, we apply this ethic of 
rights to a number of illustrative scenarios where the question is whether Gewirthian-guided 
                                                          
10  Catherine Heeney and Michael Parker, ‘Ethics and the Governance of Biobanks’ in Jane Kaye, Susan 
M.C. Gibbons, Catherine Heeney, Michael Parker and Andrew Smart, Governing Biobanks (Oxford: 
Hart, 2012) 282, 295. 
 
11  For a recent discussion, see Catherine Gliwa and Benjamin E. Berkman, ‘Do Researchers Have an 
Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?’ (2013) 13 American Journal of Bioethics 
32-42. 
  
12  Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
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researchers would do the right thing by giving (or not giving) feedback to a participant; and, at 
the same time, we draw out the implications for anonymisation (as a strategy to protect 
participant privacy) if this has the consequence that researchers are thereby disabled from 
identifying participants who have a right to be informed.     
II The Context 
Why is it that the question of the informational responsibilities of researchers should have 
become so ‘hot’? It is not that biobanks—broadly speaking, collections of biosamples, personal 
data, scans and images, and so on—are new. However, large population-wide biobanks, 
established (much like a library) as a resource to be curated for access and use by the research 
community are new; and the possibility of undertaking (and understanding the import of) quite 
detailed genotyping and sequencing is assuming much greater prominence. Moreover, where 
the studies are of a longitudinal nature, with researchers needing periodically to recontact 
participants (for example, for further samples or data to be supplied, or for remeasurement, and 
so on), it is in the nature of the project that clinically significant findings can be returned to 
individual participants.  If feedback can be given by biobanks and their researchers (or 
researchers who use the resource), the question then is whether it ought to be given. 
In many biobanks, the general rule is that ‘no feedback’ will be given to participants. However, 
in two respects ‘no feedback’ is open to misunderstanding. The ‘no feedback’ notice 
notwithstanding, there might actually be some findings that are returned to participants. 
First, even where the declared policy is one of ‘no feedback’, this usually refers to the position 
once participants’ samples and data have been ‘banked’. Prior to that point, some health-related 
information might be given to participants. For example, at the point of enrolment, participants 
might be given their blood pressure or bone density readings, or their BMI score, and so on; 
and, there might also be some advice about incidental observations as when a participant might 
be advised to check out a suspicious-looking mole with their doctor. However, once the 
samples and data have been collected and ‘banked’ for the use of researchers, the ‘no feedback’ 
policy signals that the general rule is that there will be no individual feedback arising from the 
findings made by researchers (general findings, of course, will be disseminated in the usual 
way).   
The second misunderstanding is more subtle. When a biobank declares that its policy is ‘no 
feedback’, this might mean quite literally that there is no feedback, that there is an absolute 
rule against feedback. Here, ‘no feedback’ is intended to signify that participants have no right 
to feedback and that researchers have a duty not to inform; in no circumstances will even 
clinically significant results of research undertaken on the banked materials be returned to 
individual participants. However, ‘no feedback’ might be intended less literally, signalling 
something more specific, namely that the researchers do not accept any obligation to give 
feedback. This latter reading is designed to counter participants who assert that they have a 
right to be informed and that, concomitantly, the researchers have matching obligations. While 
such a reading is intended to shield researchers against claims for feedback made by 
participants, it does not preclude the giving of feedback; but, whether or not participants are 
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informed, is exclusively for the biobanks and their researchers to decide. If the latter is the 
policy of the biobank, the relevant discretion might be structured in more than one way—for 
example, by adopting defaults of various kinds, reserving some feedback questions for case-
by-case determination, and so on; and, in practice, some feedback (drawing on research on 
banked materials) might be given.  
In the light of these remarks, consider the ‘no feedback’ policy of ALSPAC, the well-known 
longitudinal study of parents and their children in the Bristol area. ALSPAC declares its policy 
on disclosure of biomedical information to participants in the following terms:13  
The policy is that information shall not, as a general rule, be disclosed to participants.  
 
This general policy should only be set aside when it is reasonably certain that the 
benefits of disclosure clearly outweigh any possible risks to the participants or their 
families. This in turn will arise when three conditions are met:  
 
1. That an item of data gives clear, unequivocal information of an existing or future 
health problem.  
2. That the health problem identified is amenable to treatment of proven benefit  
3. That the participant has indicated beforehand that they wish to be informed if such 
a problem is identified.  
 
While the function of the ‘no feedback’ notice at ALSPAC is to scotch any idea that participants 
have a right to feedback, this does not rule out the possibility of informing individual 
participants about clinically significant findings. On this view, although participants have no 
right to be informed as such, they might nevertheless be informed if they have signalled this 
preference and provided that the researchers judge that there is a net benefit in giving individual 
feedback.  
 
One of the points made in support of the ALSPAC policy (and, likewise, biobanks that have a 
similar policy) is that participants understood when they enrolled that there would be no 
feedback. In other words, the policy is supported inter alia by the following considerations14:   
 
 Individuals have consented to participate in the study on the clear understanding that 
all measures are for research purposes only and not to inform decisions about their 
health. To emphasise this, it is often stated explicitly in the information given to 
participants.  
 As a corollary, it is frequently repeated that the tests that participants undergo are not a 
check on their health, and that if participants are worried they should go to their own 
doctors.  
 The relationship between researcher and participant differs from that between doctor 
and patient. Crucially the duty of care is different. The primary concern of a researcher 
is not to the health of a participant but to acquire information for the benefit of 
humankind.  
                                                          
13  Available at: www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers/data-access/ethics/ (last accessed September 14, 
2013). 
14  Again, drawing on the ALSPAC policy, note 13 above.  
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There is no doubt that the ALSPAC ethics committee is seeking to do the right thing but the 
question is whether, from a rights-based perspective, this paternalistic policy is appropriate. 
 
Heeney and Parker come close to answering this question. Noting that one ‘no feedback’ 
strategy is, in effect, to manage the expectations of participants, they say: 
 
One route would be to make it clear to participants and health professionals at the time 
of consent that there will be no feedback of research results. There are a number of 
arguments supporting this including its potential for greater clarity about consent and 
about the distinction between research and clinical care and the fact that feedback 
assumes some sort of infrastructure in which the connection with participants is 
maintained to the extent that they can still be contacted and told to seek medical advice, 
for example.15 
 
However, as the authors remark, this approach has fallen out of favour in those cases where 
research might ‘produce very clear evidence of a serious harm which might be avoided by an 
easily available intervention and where there exists something akin to a duty of easy rescue.’16 
In other words, if our premise is that participants have a positive right to be informed (possibly 
akin to a positive right to be rescued where this is straightforward and not difficult for the 
rescuer), we are less likely to judge that biobanks do the right thing by withholding clinically 
significant findings. Moreover, even if a ‘no feedback’ policy has been ‘communicated’ to 
participants, we might wonder whether its significance has been fully appreciated; and we 
might judge that, regardless of the biobank’s declared policy, participants ‘reasonably expect’ 
to be given feedback where a biobank holds clinically significant, serious, and actionable 
information about a particular individual.17 
 
These observations invite two lines of inquiry. First, on what basis might we defend the premise 
that participants have a positive right to be informed?  Secondly, how does the idea of 
‘reasonable expectation’ play in this context? We respond to the first question in the next part 
of the paper; and we can close the present part of the paper by making some short remarks in 
response to the second question.      
 
One of the striking features of much of our ethical and regulatory thinking (notably in relation 
to the interest in privacy) is that the recognition of a right hinges on the question of whether 
we judge that a person has a ‘reasonable expectation’ that his or her particular interests will be 
respected and protected. If a participant’s claim to have feedback hinges on whether it is based 
on a reasonable expectation to have feedback, then the question is: by reference to what 
standard or practice or to whose authority is the expectation judged to be a reasonable one? 
 
First, the participant might invoke relevant background rules of law. There has been much 
discussion of whether a participant might succeed against a researcher in a tort claim for 
                                                          
15  Heeney and Parker, note 10 above, at 296. 
 
16  Ibid. 
 
17  Compare, e.g., Susan Wolf et al ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genetics in Medicine 361-384; and Bartha M. 
Knoppers et al, ‘Population studies: Return of research results and incidental findings Policy Statement’ 
(2012) European Journal of Human Genetics doi: 10.1038/ejhg.2012.152.  
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wrongful non-disclosure.18 The consensus is that English law does not clearly support such a 
claim; and, if the legal test turns on whether it is ‘fair, just, and reasonable’ to place researchers 
under a feedback responsibility, this seems merely to restate the original question of whether 
the claimant’s expectation is a reasonable one. 
 
Where a biobank declares a ‘no feedback’ policy which is clearly notified to participants, if 
anything, this further weakens the participant’s tort claim. However, where ‘no feedback’ 
signals that the biobank reserves a discretion to give feedback, a participant might argue in a 
judicial review that the discretion has been exercised improperly. If successful, the claimant 
might compel the researchers or biobank to reconsider their decision; but, of course, a claim of 
this kind would only get off the ground if the policy set by the biobank and its administration 
were judicially reviewable. 
 
Secondly, the participant might claim that the researchers had formally or informally signalled 
that feedback would be given. Where a biobank has a well-advertised ‘no feedback’ policy, 
this kind of claim would be unlikely to succeed. However, if the policy had not been signalled, 
then the claim would turn on whether the participant could show on the facts that an 
undertaking to provide feedback had been given. In principle, unless the background law 
prohibited researchers from giving feedback, their voluntary assumption of a responsibility to 
give feedback would be a strong ground for claiming a reasonable expectation of feedback. 
 
Thirdly, the participant might rely on a general attitude that there should be some reciprocity 
in the relationship with researchers: participants assist researchers in various ways in return for 
which researchers should assist participants by giving appropriate feedback. There does seem 
to be evidence that at least some (and, quite possibly, many) participants sign up with the 
expectation that there will be reciprocation.19  However, the fact that others share one’s own 
expectation does not make anyone’s expectation reasonable. Possibly, the claim for reciprocity 
might be grounded in some other way—for example, in the way that Henry Richardson relies 
on the relationship of ‘entrustment’ between participants and researchers20; but it is not enough 
that the de facto expectation is widely held by participants. 
 
Fourthly, the participant might rely on the settled custom and practice at other biobanks or in 
a certain sector of research (or, indeed, in clinical practice as genetic analysis becomes routine). 
For example, it might be that researchers who work with MRI scans might consider it best 
practice to return incidental findings to their participants. Accordingly, where there are such 
practices and where the claimant participant is dealing with researchers at a biobank with no 
declared policy on feedback, the unstated assumption (and expectation) that there will be 
feedback might look perfectly reasonable. However, where ‘no feedback’ is the declared rule, 
                                                          
18  Seminally, see Carolyn Johnston and Jane Kaye, ‘Does the UK Biobank have a Legal Obligation to 
Feedback Individual Findings to Participants?’ (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 239.  
 
19  Jasper Bovenberg et al ‘Always expect the unexpected: Legal and social aspects of reporting Biobank 
research results to individual research participants’ (Nijmegen: Radboud University, Centre for Society 
and Genomics, 2009); Laura M. Beskow et al, ‘Research Participants’ Perspectives on Genotype-Driven 
Research Recruitment’ (2011) 6(4) Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics 3-20; and 
Wellcome Trust and Medical Research Council, Assessing Public Attitudes to Health Related Findings 
in Research (London, April 2012).  
 
20  Henry S. Richardson, Moral Entanglements: The Ancillary-Care Obligations of Medical Researchers 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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contrary custom and practice notwithstanding, the argument that there is a reasonable 
expectation of feedback is seriously weakened. 
 
What these appeals to reasonableness have in common is that they rely on a range of contingent 
factors being set in the right way. If the law supports a claim to feedback, if researchers 
voluntarily assume a responsibility to give feedback, if custom and practice supports giving 
feedback, and the like, then the participant’s claim will get to first base; and, other things (such 
as the notification of the biobank’s policy) being equal, the participant’s expectation will show 
as a reasonable one. Where ‘reasonable expectation’ is the test, then the participant will be 
judged to be entitled to be informed.  
 
By contrast, a participant might claim to have a reasonable expectation of being given feedback 
because a right to be informed is grounded in reason—not in contingent legal provisions or 
promises or custom and practice. Quite simply, if a participant has such a reason-based right to 
be informed, it would be reasonable (to put the claim at its lowest) to expect to be informed. 
The question, to which we now turn, is how such a right might be rationally grounded. 
 
III A Rationally-Grounded Right to be Informed 
 
According to Alan Gewirth,21 agents22 categorically ought to accept the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC)─which requires them to grant generic rights (rights to the generic 
conditions of agency GCAs) to all agents. The reason why the PGC is categorically binding on 
agents is that it is dialectically necessary for agents to accept it, which is to say that an agent 
(any agent─call him ‘Albert’) fails to understand what it is to be an agent (hence implicitly 
contradicts the idea that he is an agent) if he does not accept it. 
 
In essence, for the PGC to be dialectically necessary it is necessary and sufficient for three 
propositions to be true, which are: 
 
(1) ‘“If doing X or having Y is necessary for Albert to pursue or achieve his chosen purpose 
E, then Albert ought to do X or act to secure Y or else give up pursuit of E”, which is 
to say that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives of Instrumental Reason (PHI) is 
dialectically necessary’.  
(2) ‘It is possible for there to be GCAs’. 
(3) ‘If it is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept that he ought to do Z, then it is 
dialectically necessary, not only for every other agent (say Brenda) to accept that she 
ought to do Z, but for Albert to accept that he ought to act in accord with the principle 
that Brenda ought to do Z unless this would prevent Albert from acting in accordance 
with the principle that Albert ought to do Z’. 
  
From (1) and (2) it follows that it is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept 
 
(4) ‘I (Albert) ought defend my  possession of the GCAs unless I am willing to accept the 
generic damage to my ability to pursue or achieve my purposes (generic damage being 
                                                          
21   See note 12 above. 
 
22   Those capable of acting for reasons. In effect, those who have the capacity to do things voluntarily in 
order to achieve purposes that they have chosen. 
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damage to my ability to pursue or achieve every purpose I might have) that will result 
from my non-possession of the GCAs’. 
 
For the sake of brevity, we will express (4) as the proposition that it is dialectically necessary 
for Albert to accept that he ought to defend his possession of the GCAs from interference 
against his will. 
 
If (3) is also true, then it follows from (4) that it is also dialectically necessary for Albert to 
accept that he ought to defend Brenda’s possession of the GCAs from interference that is 
against her will, provided only that doing so does not prevent him from defending his own 
possession of the GCAs from interference against his will (and vice versa). But this is 
equivalent to it being true that the PGC is dialectically necessary for all agents. 
 
We submit that (1) and (2) are clearly true. (1) is true because it is analytic. (2) is true because 
its truth follows simply from the coherence of the idea that there might be GCAs. The 
contentious proposition is (3). We will not, here, attempt to explain why we believe (3) to be 
true also.23 This is because, for present purposes, it will suffice for us to establish that the 
English legal system  ought to comply with the PGC on the assumption that it recognises that 
all human beings are equal in dignity and rights.  This is because the proposition that human 
beings are equal in dignity and rights is one that the English legal system currently purports to 
uphold,24  and when this proposition is combined with propositions (1) and (2) then acceptance 
of the PGC follows (not as dialectically necessary) but as contingent upon acceptance of the 
proposition that human beings are equal in dignity and rights.25         
 
Now, whether justified as dialectically necessary or as dialectically contingent upon the 
acceptance of human rights, the generic rights prescribed by the PGC are clearly rights under 
the will-conception. The duty that Albert has to defend Brenda’s GCAs is, by the nature of the 
right he must recognise she has, one that she may release him from by her will (provided only 
that doing so will not generically damage other agents against their will). However, if Brenda 
is to exercise her will in relation to acts or decisions that might affect her possession of the 
GCAs she clearly needs to know what the effect of these acts might be on this possession and 
                                                          
23  See Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan 
Gewirth’s Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991) for a comprehensive defence of the argument for the dialectical necessity of the PGC. For a recent 
specific defence of (3), see Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically 
Binding Impartial Reasons to Real Agents’ (2013) 10 Journal of Moral Philosophy 204-226. 
 
24  It does so by the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires English law to be interpreted in conformity 
with the substantive rights of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) if it is at all possible 
to do so. The Preamble to the ECHR, states that it is a first step to give effect to the rights declared in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 (UDHR). Article 1 of the UDHR states that all human 
beings are equal in dignity and rights.  Granted, the Human Rights Act permits departure from the ECHR. 
On this basis, the acceptance of the principle that human beings are equal in dignity and human rights 
seems to be a qualified one. However, it is arguable that departure from this principle remains unqualified 
as acceptance of the substantive rights of the ECHR cannot even be qualified acceptance if Article 1 of 
the UDHR is not accepted in an unqualified manner. This is because Article 1 UDHR in part defines 
what it is to be a human right. 
 
25  For more detail see Deryck Beyleveld ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle 
of Human Rights’ (2011) 13 Human Rights Review 1-18. 
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also about the alternatives that are available. In other words she must be granted a right to be 
informed. 
 
The generic rights are also, clearly, both positive and negative. Albert has a right that Brenda 
not act to interfere with Albert’s possession of the GCAs against his will, and also a right that 
she assist him to secure his possession of the GCAs when he cannot do so by his own unaided 
efforts if she can assist without disproportionate risk to her own possession of the GCAs.26 This 
is simply because in order to defend his possession of the GCAs, Albert needs to have them; 
so he needs assistance when he cannot defend his own possession as much as he needs non-
interference. He, thus, must have the same attitude towards assistance to secure the GCAs that 
he needs and desires as he must have to interference with his GCAs that is against his will. So, 
if Albert ought to defend Brenda’s possession of the GCAs from interference against her will, 
he ought also to assist her to secure that possession when she cannot do so for herself and she 
so wishes, etc.       
 
IV Applications of a Participant’s Right to be Informed   
 
If participants have a (Gewirthian-based) prima facie right that researchers inform them about 
matters that bear on their GCAs, such as their individual health and well-being, then it is clear 
why there should be feedback when the information is potentially life-saving, when the burden 
of informing is low, and when the participant is not otherwise able (or likely) to access the 
information.  However, there are still many questions about the right and about the hard cases 
that might arise. In this part of the paper, we address five such further questions. 
 
(i) Participant’s consent 
  
The first question concerns the relationship between A’s right to be informed and whatever 
consent A may give or withhold to the researchers’ proposed arrangements for feedback or ‘no 
feedback’. Clearly, if A has a right to have feedback, and if A wishes to have feedback, then it 
is not strictly necessary for A to consent to having feedback. That said, in a context where it is 
possible that A might not wish to have feedback, getting A to confirm consent to feedback 
leaves no doubt that A does wish to stand on his right.  
 
As controller of the right (such as the right to be informed by B), A has three options in relation 
to the operation of the right. They are as follows: 
 
(a) A may require B to inform him (A insists on B performing the duty); 
(b) A may prohibit B from informing him (A in effect exercises a ‘right not to know’27); or 
(c) A may permit B to inform or not to inform him. 
                                                          
26  While non-possession of a GCA has a generic effect on an agent’s ability to act, i.e. it negatively affects 
that ability whatever the agent’s purposes, this effect can be more or less immediate, more or less capable 
of amelioration, and more or less severe. For example to kill someone has an immediate, not ameliorable, 
effect of maximum severity. It stops the agent from attempting to act, from maintaining the capacity to 
act and from improving the capacity to act. A disease might eventually kill someone but might be 
treatable. Ill health might reduce one’s ability to act successfully in a generic way but the extent to which 
it has this effect can vary. (see Gewirth, Reason and Morality note 12 above, 48-63). Because this is so, 
the generic rights are ranked in a hierarchy according to their ‘needfulness’ for action, and this ranking 
is to be used to determine when a generic risk is proportionate or disproportionate.  
 
27  See McLean, note 1 above, at 178-180 (in the context of autonomy and genetic information). 
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Where A opts for (c), A consents to B not informing him; and where B then acts within the 
terms of this authorisation, B does no wrong to A (relative to A’s right to be informed).28 
Provided that A’s agreeing to ‘no feedback’ is equivalent to A consenting not to be informed, 
then the position is as in (c). 
 
What about case (b), where A signals that there is to be no feedback? Harking back to Sheila 
McLean’s thesis, if the researchers are to respect A’s autonomy, and the particular setting that 
A has chosen for the operation of the right to be informed, they will give no feedback. If they 
do so, because they judge (paternalistically) that this is in A’s best interests, they (and the law 
if it supports such action) have failed to keep faith with respect for the agent’s autonomy. 
 
While it is tolerably clear what researchers should do when A’s position is known, it is much 
more problematic when the will of a participant is not known. For example, where a research 
project began before feedback became such a hot topic, participants might not have been asked 
the right questions. In such a context of uncertainty, how should researchers proceed? It would 
be easy if the researchers could recontact each of the participants to establish their will in 
relation to feedback. There might be a few cases where this is possible. However, we assume 
that there will be many cases where it is simply not possible to establish the participant’s 
position, including cases where this is not possible without giving the game away. Where this 
is so, how should researchers proceed?  
 
A plausible default position for the research community is to inform a participant if the return 
of the finding is clinically actionable and possibly life-saving. To give feedback in such 
circumstances is analogous to treating a person rendered unconscious in an accident when it is 
not known whether that person wants to be treated but when, at the same time, without the 
treatment the person will be seriously damaged or will die. Indeed, the default for feedback 
might be further elaborated according to whether the condition is life-threatening and the 
treatment low risk. If feedback is given in these circumstances, and if the participant would 
have wanted feedback (and now welcomes it), then all is well. However, the problem with this 
particular case of uncertainty is that the researchers do not know what the participant would 
have wanted and when, following the default, they give feedback, the participant might not 
welcome it. If so, the researchers have acted in a way that is out of line with the participant’s 
right to be (not) informed. However, there is no easy option. If researchers guess wrong, they 
either give feedback that is potentially life-saving but not in line with the participant’s will, 
or—and this is hardly an attractive alternative—they withhold feedback in line with the 
participant’s will and do nothing to assist the participant’s health.29   
 
If a default of the kind just sketched looks defensible where the finding is clinically actionable, 
what about the case where it is not actionable? In this kind of case, it becomes more plausible 
for researchers to suppose that the individual participant really might not wish to know. Indeed, 
even some participants who have signed up for feedback might not wish to know; but, of 
course, there will be others who value this feedback in order to put their affairs in order or 
maximise what is left of their lives. Again, researchers are on the horns of an impossible 
dilemma: if they get it wrong, either they give feedback to a participant who would not have 
                                                          
28  See Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2007).  
 
29 Compare the shape of the analysis in Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘Emerging 
Technologies, Extreme Uncertainty, and the Principle of Rational Precautionary Reasoning’ (2012) 4 
Law Innovation and Technology 35.  
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wanted to know and who derives no benefit from the information given, or they withhold 
feedback from a participant who would have wished to know and who would have valued the 
information (bad news though it is).   
 
The lesson to be taken from this seems to be that researchers need to talk participants through 
the different kinds of feedback that might be given (whether it is actionable, whether treatment 
would be burdensome, and so on) and then ask participants to indicate how they wish to 
exercise their right to be informed. No doubt, the indications given at enrolment can be 
reviewed or refreshed periodically; and, if participants have on-line access to their own 
password-protected feedback files, then they can edit their files in accordance with their latest 
wishes.    
 
(ii) Unclear information: genetic markers 
 
‘No feedback’ policies often are justified by saying that the researchers do not wish to return 
false positive findings and cause participants unnecessary anxiety and distress. As biobanks 
facilitate various kinds of genetic analysis, there will be many markers the clinical significance 
of which is unclear. If the researchers cannot say with confidence what the significance of the 
marker is, is ‘no feedback’ the right policy? 
 
Clearly, if participants have a right to be informed, ‘no feedback’ cannot be the right policy 
simply because the researchers so decide; it can only be the right policy if this is the will of the 
participant—and this simply continues the discussion of the previous section. Picking up that 
discussion, the pertinent question is about the kind of conversation that researchers need to 
have with their prospective participants.30 Information needs to be given, in an accessible form, 
about the best understanding that researchers have about the link between particular genetic 
markers and their impact on the health of the individuals concerned.  This conversation will 
reveal different levels and degrees of uncertainty, most importantly uncertainties about the 
nature of the link between the marker and the expression of particular diseases. In all 
probability, the genetics community (both researchers and clinicians) will rapidly develop 
guidelines placing each particular marker in one of three categories: for return; to be considered 
for return; and not for return.31 Where such a recommended feedback scheme is in place, it 
might be presented to prospective participants as ‘non-negotiable’, as applicable subject to 
‘opt-out’, or as an option available by ‘opt-in’. 
 
In this vein, the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics has recently 
recommended that, in the context of clinical exome and genome sequencing, there should be a 
(reviewable) list of variants that should always be returned to patients.32 Variants on this 
minimum list, the College estimates, will be included in about 1% of sequencing reports. 
Summarising its proposal, the College says: 
                                                          
30  For some helpful remarks on the rapidly changing context of genomics and its bearing on feedback to 
participants, see Erik Parens, Paul Appelbaum, and Wendy Chung, ‘Incidental Findings in the Era of 
Whole Genome Sequencing?’ (2013) 43:4 Hastings Center Report 16-19. 
 
31  See Wolf et al, note 17 above. 
 
32  Robert C. Green et al, ‘ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical 
Exome and Genome Sequencing’ available at http://www.acmg.net/docs/ACMG_Releases_Highly-
Anticipated_Recommendations_on_Incidental_Findings_in_Clinical_Exome_and_Genome_Sequencin
g.pdf (last accessed July 24, 2013). See, too, Parens et al, note 30 above. 
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[T]he Working Group has recommended that when a report is issued for clinically 
indicated exome and genome sequencing, a minimum list of conditions, genes and 
variants should be routinely evaluated and reported to the ordering clinician who can 
place them into the context of that patient’s medical and family history, physical 
examination and other laboratory testing. We have recommended that these findings be 
reported without seeking preferences from the patient and family and without limitation 
due to the patient’s age….The Working Group recognizes that this list should, and will, 
evolve as further empirical data are collected on the actual penetrance of these variants, 
and on the health benefits and costs that might follow from their disclosure as incidental 
findings.33 
 
Recognising that its recommendations ‘may be seen to violate existing ethical norms regarding 
the patient’s autonomy and “right not to know” genetic risk information’,34 the College defends 
its position in the following terms: 
 
[Given that the minimum list] is weighted toward conditions where prevalence may be 
high and intervention may be possible, we felt that clinicians and laboratory personnel 
have a fiduciary duty to prevent harm by warning patients and their families about 
certain incidental findings and that this principle supersedes concerns about autonomy, 
just as it does in the reporting of incidental findings elsewhere in medical practice.35 
 
So long as patient autonomy is reduced to patient preferences, the College’s position might be 
justifiable. However, if patients have a Gewirthian based right not to know, the College’s 
position, however well-meaning, is irrational.   
 
What if a patient, having been told about the return of incidental findings where variants are 
on the minimum list, objects and wishes to exercise their right not to know? According to the 
College, the only options for such a patient (with, as the College would have it, such 
preferences) are either to ‘decline clinical sequencing if they judge the risks of possible 
discovery of incidental findings to outweigh the benefits of testing’36 or to agree to the clinical 
sequencing on the College’s standard minimum list terms. If the NHS were to adopt this 
approach in its 100,000 genomes project37, we take it that it would not only be Gewirthians 
who would protest about such a violation of patients’ rights to be treated. 
 
Returning to the context of research, suppose that the terms and conditions for participation in 
a particular study were to adopt a non-negotiable feedback policy along the lines of the 
College’s minimum list. For prospective participants, the choice is to participate on these terms 
or not at all. If a prospective participant, not wishing to have such feedback, was then excluded 
from the study, would this be a violation of his or her rights? Although concerns are sometimes 
                                                          
33  Green, note 32 above, at 19-20. 
 
34  Green, note 32 above, at 11. 
 
35  Ibid. 
 
36  Ibid. 
 
37  http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/dec/10/1000000-peoples-dna-mapped (last accessed July 25, 
2013). 
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expressed about willing participants being unfairly excluded, and although exclusion would 
frustrate one of the would-be participant’s projects, there would be no violation of the agent’s 
generic rights. Whether there was some violation of a contingent right would depend on the 
context, on what was reasonably expected, and the like.      
 
(iii) Informing third parties 
 
In the context of third-party interests, McLean observes quite correctly that ‘[j]ust as genetic 
information may devastate those who willingly seek it out, so too it may harm those who did 
not search for it but who are provided with it nonetheless in their purported interests.’38 This 
prompts the following question: Do researchers have a responsibility to inform third parties 
(for example, genetically-related members of a participant’s family) where they have findings 
that bear on the health and well-being of the latter? If the question were put to an English court, 
it is quite likely that, even if the liability of researchers to participants had been recognised, 
liability to third parties would be denied—judges would simply be too nervous about over-
extending liability and burdening researchers. Moreover, liability would probably be denied on 
the ground that the relationship between researchers and third parties, unlike that between 
researchers and participants, lacked sufficient proximity. However, from a Gewirthian 
perspective, there is no obvious reason to deny third parties positive rights against researchers, 
including a right to have individual feedback arising from the research project—whatever a 
lack of ‘proximity’ might mean to common lawyers, it does not resonate in the same way for 
Gewirthians. Nevertheless, as McLean’s remarks foreshadow, even from this perspective there 
are some complex issues of principle and practice. 
 
To start with one of the issues of principle: what is the position if the participant has exercised 
their right not to know? Clearly, the participant (unless specially authorised to act for third 
parties) has no right to exercise the rights of third parties: if the participant elects to have no 
feedback, this cannot entail that there is no feedback for third parties. Therefore, it is perfectly 
possible that, while a participant elects to have no feedback, a third party might have elected 
to have feedback if they had been asked. This gives rise to two questions: first, what is the right 
thing for researchers to do where they cannot give feedback to a third party (whose position on 
feedback is not known) without informing a participant who has elected to have no feedback; 
and, secondly, if the views of third parties are registered when participants are enrolled, does 
this mean that some prospective participants might be unfairly excluded because they cannot 
accept the feedback policy in relation to third parties? 
 
The first question returns us to our discussion on consent. There, we suggested that a defensible 
default for researchers might be to give feedback to a participant whose will is not known where 
the condition is clinically actionable. Other things being equal, this might also be a plausible 
default in relation to a third party. However, we are now assuming two complicating factors: 
one is that researchers cannot give feedback to the third party without violating the participant’s 
rights (the participant having elected not to be informed)39; and the other is that, without 
                                                          
38  McLean, note 1 above, at 222. 
 
39  This has the makings of a question of competing or conflicting rights of the kind that we discuss in the 
next sub-section below. If the participant and the third party each rely on a ‘right to be informed’ (one 
not wanting to be informed, the other wanting to be informed), the question is one of competing rights; 
if, however, we characterise the participant’s right as a different ‘right not to be informed’, the question 
is one of conflicting rights—a case of the participant’s ‘right not to be informed’ coming into conflict 
with the third party’s ‘right to be informed’. 
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knowing the position of the third party, giving feedback might or might not be in line with the 
will of the third party. At best, researchers would violate the rights of the participant and inform 
the third party in a way that is in line with the latter’s will. At worst, they would act in a way 
that was in line with neither the will of the participant rights-holder nor that of the third-party 
rights-holder. On balance, respecting the rights and the known will of the participant seems 
like the more defensible default.  
 
The second question, concerning the exclusion of prospective participants, takes us back to our 
recent discussion about genetics and the minimum list. There, we suggested that there is no 
generic right to participate; but there might be context-dependent contingent rights. Here, there 
is no reason to change that view.  
 
(iv) Conflicting and competing rights 
 
Rights theories are commonly rejected on the ground that they cannot handle questions of 
conflicting or competing rights. We should note that there is a difference between competing 
rights (where each agent, A and B, pleads the same right R, for example, in relation to a scarce 
resource) and conflicting rights (where agents A and B each plead a different right); but critics 
maintain that rights theory collapses when presented with either kind of case. Certainly, unless 
a rights theory holds that conceptually rights cannot conflict (in which case rights are 
recognised rather sparingly and then specified very precisely) there has to be a strategy for 
dealing with conflicts. Briefly, where rights compete, the spirit of Gewirthian ethics is to try to 
give priority to the agent whose need (as expressed by the right) is the greater; and, where 
rights conflict, the strategy is to try to give priority to the right that ranks as more important 
relative the generic needs of agents.  
 
To start with competing rights, consider again a hypothetical case in which a participant has 
exercised her right to be informed by indicating that she does not wish to have feedback (for 
example, about a predisposition to cancer) but a related third-party has exercised the same right 
by registering a wish to have feedback. Where it is not possible to inform the third-party 
without also informing the participant, it is not at all obvious which right should prevail. 
Possibly the context will indicate that the generic needs of one agent are greater than those of 
the other; but, on the face of it, their needs are much the same. If there really is nothing to 
choose between the parties, it might be necessary to resort to some secondary and contingent 
considerations—for example, the view in the community might be that, because the participant 
is actually assisting the researchers, it is only fair that the researchers should tip the balance in 
her favour. 
 
Moving on to conflicting rights, those who favour a ‘no feedback’ policy often point out, quite 
correctly, that giving feedback involves opportunity costs for the researchers. The more time 
that researchers spend on feedback, the less time that they will spend on the research project 
and the longer it will take for, say, a new drug or diagnostic test to be developed. Suppose that 
this is presented as a conflicting rights issue, with the participant’s right to have feedback 
opposed by the rights of agents generally to have beneficial health-related research come to 
fruition. However, barring some exceptional circumstances, agents surely do not have a generic 
right that others undertake health-care research, let alone research that is tailored to their 
particular needs. If this is correct, the generic right to be informed prevails. Granted, if we 
examine the way in which a particular research study is funded, we might detect certain 
expectations about the delivery of health-care benefits. Even so, these contingent expectations 
cannot overcome generic rights unless the rights-holders have consented. It seems likely, 
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therefore, that the generic right to be informed is going to be difficult to overcome when 
supposedly conflicting rights are set against it.     
 
(v) Relationship with privacy and anonymisation 
 
Article 1 of Directive 95/46/EC, to which the UK gives effect via the Data Protection Act 1998, 
requires the processing of personal data to be consistent with fundamental rights and freedoms 
of data subjects (those whose personal data is being processed), especially the right to privacy. 
Recital 26 of the Directive states that the principles of data protection do not apply to data 
rendered anonymous, by which it means data rendered so that the data subject cannot be 
identified from it directly or indirectly (e.g., by use of a code) by anyone without 
disproportionate effort. Article 8 of the Directive prohibits the processing of sensitive personal 
data (which includes data on the health of the data subject), unless certain conditions are 
satisfied. Now, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (the privacy right) is engaged 
whenever data on a person’s health is processed without the explicit consent of the data 
subject.40 This means, though this is not clear from either the Directive or the Data Protection 
Act, that data on a person’s health may not be processed without the explicit consent of the 
data subject unless conditions laid down in Article 8.2 ECHR are satisfied if the instruments in 
question are to be compatible with the ECHR. 
 
Recital 26 of the Directive has, however, led many, including the UK’s Information 
Commissioner,41 to consider that privacy is fully protected by rendering personal data 
anonymous and that doing so places the data outside of the remit of the Directive. However,  
there are circumstances in which rendering personal data anonymous (in the way that Recital 
26 of the Directive specifies) will violate the right to privacy, or if not that, then some other 
fundamental right, unless the consent of the data subject is obtained.42 From what we have 
argued in this paper, this is fully in line with what the PGC requires, and will include cases 
where the data, if it can still be connected to the patient, could be used to treat the patient, or 
warn the patient of a serious health-threatening risk, while rendering the data anonymous 
renders this impossible. 
 
In relation to this, it should be noted that rendering data anonymous is itself, per both the 
Directive and the UK Act, a process performed on personal data, which means that it is 
something that needs the consent of the patient, in relation to which, where anonymisation is 
                                                          
40  See the case of M.S. v. Sweden (1997) 28 EHRR 313, paragraphs 34–35. 
 
41  See the Information Commissioner’s guidance of 2012 ‘Data Protection: Anonymisation: managing 
data protection risk code of practice ‘ especially at page 11 (available at  
http:/www.ico.org.uk/for_organisation/data_protection/topic_guides/) (last accessed September 14, 
2013).  
 
42  To be sure, the Information Commissioner recognises that, especially in medical research  the use of 
personal data might be necessary (see ibid. 13). But the Information Commissioner confuses matters by 
asserting in the summary to the guidance (also available  at 
http:/www.ico.org.uk/for_organisation/data_protection/topic_guides/) that while there are 
circumstances in which the ECHR will render it  inappropriate to use anonymised data, these do not 
affect the Data Protection Act. This is false because the Data Protection Directive (see Article 1.1), 
and, therefore the UK Act (if properly implemented) exist to protect the rights of individuals under the 
Convention in relation to the processing of personal data.  Processing that violates the ECHR will also 
violate the Directive. 
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contemplated, the patient needs to be informed of the consequences of anonymisation 
(including whatever consequences this might have in relation to the right to be informed). 
 
V Conclusion 
 
To return to our starting point, in an important contribution to the jurisprudence of medical 
law, Sheila McLean charts the failure to bring informed consent into alignment with the 
requirements of autonomy. We take it to be implicit in McLean’s critique, first, that respecting 
the autonomy of persons (whether patients or research participants) is fundamentally right and, 
secondly, that it would not be appropriate to remedy the legal pathology by weakening our 
valuation of autonomy. 
 
Reading McLean’s critique from our Gewirthian perspective, we share her vision of flourishing 
agency—that is, the vision of agents acting autonomously in the sense that they freely choose 
and pursue their own projects and purposes. However, none of this is possible without the 
generic conditions of agency being secured and respected. Accordingly, the moral imperative 
for the law is to ensure that, in all its articulations—in its primary respect for autonomy and 
well-being as well as in its treatment of informed consent—it is compatible with the generic 
needs of agency. 
 
The question of whether researchers should give clinically significant feedback to their 
participants brings into focus the positive (informational) rights of agents in relation to their 
generic needs.43 If the law is to keep faith, not only with the autonomy of agents, but more 
fundamentally with the protection of the generic conditions that are presupposed by the myriad 
autonomous choices made by agents, it cannot routinely accept that ‘no feedback’44 is a 
legitimate position for researchers to specify in their protocols. If a failure to give a participant 
feedback is also a failure to respond to the generic needs of the agent in question, then the law 
should require the withholding of feedback to be justified by reference to one or more of three 
kinds of reasons: (i) that the right to be informed is not engaged—for example, because giving 
feedback is ‘disproportionate’ relative to the researcher’s own generic needs, or the participant 
is in a position to gain the information without any acts of assistance; (ii) that giving feedback 
would be contrary to the will (consent) of the participant; or (iii) that giving feedback to the 
participant would be to infringe an even more important right of another agent. The law has 
good reasons to take seriously the claim that researchers have a responsibility to give feedback; 
but there can also be good reasons for judging that, in a particular case, the giving of feedback 
is not required or even permitted.45 
 
 
 
                                                          
43  Throughout Autonomy, Consent and the Law, McLean maintains that there is no deep opposition between 
individual and relational conceptions of autonomy, that agents might freely choose to act in a way that 
recognises their responsibilities to, so to speak, ‘connected’ others. From a Gewirthian view, it is clearly 
the case that agents might freely choose to act in this way. However, the optionality of such ‘relational’ 
action should not be taken out of context: where the generic rights (both negative and positive) of other 
agents are engaged, autonomy is necessarily circumscribed by agency responsibilities.  
 
44  In either of the senses that we identified in Part II. 
 
45  Roger Brownsword wishes to make it absolutely clear that this chapter, exploring the implications of 
Gewirthian ethics for giving feedback to research participants, is co-authored in his personal capacity 
and in no sense represents the views of the Ethics and Governance Council of UK Biobank. 
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